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Abstract. A prominent pillar of Bayesian philosophy is that, relative to just a few con-
straints, priors “wash out” in the limit. Bayesians often appeal to such asymptotic results
as a defense against charges of excessive subjectivity. But, as Seidenfeld and coauthors ob-
serve, what happens in the short run is often of greater interest than what happens in the
limit. They use this point as one motivation for investigating the counterintuitive short run
phenomenon of dilation since, it is alleged, “dilation contrasts with the asymptotic merging
of posterior probabilities reported by Savage (1954) and by Blackwell and Dubins (1962)”
(Herron et al., 1994). A partition dilates an event if, relative to every cell of the partition,
uncertainty concerning that event increases. The measure of uncertainty relevant for dila-
tion, however, is not the same measure that is relevant in the context of results concerning
whether priors wash out or “opinions merge.” Here, we explicitly investigate the short run
behavior of the metric relevant to merging of opinions. As with dilation, it is possible for
uncertainty (as gauged by this metric) to increase relative to every cell of a partition. We
call this phenomenon distention. It turns out that dilation and distention are orthogonal
phenomena.
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1. Introduction
A specter is haunting the theory of imprecise probabilities—the specter of dilation.1 When
dilation occurs, learning new information increases uncertainty. Dilation is especially inter-
esting because, relative to a dilating partition, uncertainty grows no matter which cell an
agent learns. This has prompted investigations into the rational status of willingness to pay
“negative tuition,” that is, willingness to pay not to learn (e.g., Kadane et al., 2008). Yet
dilation is not the only way for uncertainty to grow relative to every cell of a partition for
imprecise probabilities (IP). With dilation, the focus is on the uncertainty about a particular
event. But uncertainty about a given event is not the only kind of uncertainty with which
we might be concerned. We might instead be concerned about overall uncertainty. In this
study, we will be so concerned. Given a set of probabilities and a (positive, measurable)
partition, distention occurs when the (supremum of the) total variation distance increases no
matter which cell of the partition an agent learns. Since each cell induces an increase in total
variation for a set of probabilities, conditional on any cell, the set of probabilities is “more
Date: August 22, 2020.
1We are delighted to contribute to this collection of essays in honor of Teddy Seidenfeld’s career. We have
both learned a tremendous amount from Teddy’s work, which is a model of clear and precise philosophy. We
hope the present paper contributes to one of the many interesting topics of Teddy’s research.
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spread” than it is unconditionally. In this sense, uncertainty—not about a particular event,
but of a global sort—is sure to grow. Distention, like dilation, then, is a way for evidence to
increase uncertainty across an entire evidential partition. As far as we know, ours is the first
articulation and investigation of the phenomenon of distention.
Several considerations motivate our study. With their justly celebrated “merging of opin-
ions” theorem, Blackwell and Dubins establish that, relative to just a few assumptions,
Bayesians achieve consensus in the limit almost surely (1962). That priors “wash out” in
this way is an important pillar of Bayesian philosophy (Savage, 1954; Edwards et al., 1963;
Gaifman and Snir, 1982; Earman, 1992; Huttegger, 2015).2 Schervish and Seidenfeld extend
Blackwell and Dubins’s result to IP theory, establishing that certain convex polytopes of
probabilities exhibit uniform merging (Schervish and Seidenfeld, 1990, Corollary 1).3 But
as Herron, Seidenfeld, and Wasserman observe about Blackwell and Dubins’s result, “What
happens asymptotically, almost surely, is not always a useful guide to the short run” (1997, p.
412). Disagreements can persist, or even increase, over finite time horizons even though they
vanish in the limit. Herron et al. use this point, however, to motivate an investigation into
dilation. The idea is supposed to be that an increase in disagreement among the elements of
a set of probabilities in the dilation sense is the opposite of an increase in agreement among
those elements in the merging sense. But, as we will show, an occurrence of dilation does
not imply an increase in disagreement in the Blackwell and Dubins model (Section 4). We
propose instead to investigate the “short run” behavior of total variation, the metric with
which Blackwell and Dubins are concerned. One way of reading our position in this paper is
that much of the attention bestowed on dilation amounts to stolen valor.
Another motivation for investigating distention comes from social epistemology. In Nielsen
and Stewart (2020), we introduce the notions of local and global probabilistic opinion po-
larization between agents. There, we note 1) that the dilation phenomenon for imprecise
probabilities is in some ways analogous to local polarization, and 2) that local and global
polarization are logically independent. This presents our context of discovery for distention:
it is the phenomenon analogous to global polarization for imprecise probabilities.
Furthermore, in many cases, it is natural to be concerned with overall uncertainty as we
construe it in this essay. Many inquiries do not center on just a single event or proposition
of interest, but focus on a host of questions. At least, we claim, this is one legitimate way
to construe some inquiries. For such inquiries, an agent or group may be concerned with his
or their estimates over an entire space of possibilities, and with how new information affects
those estimates. In this kind of case, total variation seems the more appropriate measure of
increases and decreases of uncertainty.
After rehearsing the basics of dilation (Section 2), we define distention precisely (Section
3), show that it is logically independent of dilation (Section 4, Proposition 1), and provide
a characterization (Section 5, Proposition 2). We then draw some connections between local
and global polarization in social epistemology, on the one hand, and dilation and distention
in IP theory, on the other (Section 6). We conclude by considering some further ramifications
of distention (Section 7).
2As Edwards, Lindman, and Savage write, “This approximate merging of initially divergent opinions is, we
think, one reason why empirical research is called ‘objective’” (1963, p. 197).
3Convexity is often imposed on sets of probabilities in the IP setting (e.g., Levi, 1980). Convex polytopes
of probabilities emerge naturally in many contexts for IP (e.g., Levi, 1985; Stewart and Ojea Quintana, 2018),
with Bronevich and Klir even claiming that “It is convenient and rational [...] that each such set of probability
measures is a convex polytope” (2010, p. 366). We return briefly to the topic of convexity in Section 5.
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2. Dilation
Our main interest in this essay is in certain aspects of the theory of imprecise probabili-
ties. We adopt a formalism based on sets of probability measures, though several alternative
frameworks have been studied (Walley, 2000; Augustin et al., 2014). There are a number of
motivations for IP. Imprecise probabilities are an important tool in robustness analysis for
standard Bayesian inference (Walley, 1991; Berger, 1994). Sets of probabilities are useful in
studying group decision problems (Levi, 1982; Seidenfeld et al., 1989) and opinion pooling
(Elkin and Wheeler, 2018; Stewart and Ojea Quintana, 2018). IP provides more general
models of uncertainty which are often championed as superior for a number of normative
considerations relevant to epistemology and decision making (Levi, 1974; Walley, 1991). Sets
of probabilities can also be used to represent partial elicitation of precise subjective proba-
bilities. Some have argued that IP presents a more realistic theory of human epistemology
(Arlo´-Costa and Helzner, 2010). IP allows for a principled introduction of incomplete prefer-
ences in the setting of expected utility maximization (Seidenfeld, 1993; Kaplan, 1996), and
has been used to offer resolutions of some of the paradoxes of decision (Levi, 1986). And there
are other considerations driving the development of the theory of imprecise probabilities.
Dilation is the (at least at first blush) counterintuitive phenomenon of learning increasing
uncertainty.4 For a dilating partition, learning any cell results in greater uncertainty. Take
the simple, stock example of flipping a coin. This experiment partitions the sample space
into two cells, one corresponding to heads, the other to tails. It could be the case that, for
some event A, no matter how the coin lands, the agent’s estimate for A (P (A) = 0.5, say)
will be strictly included in the agent’s estimate conditional on the outcome of the coin toss
([0.1, 0.9], for example). Example 1 details such a case.
Throughout, let Ω be a sample space of elementary events or possible worlds. Elements of Ω
can be thought of as maximally specific epistemic possibilities for an agent. Let F be a sigma-
algebra on Ω, i.e., a non-empty collection of subsets of Ω closed under complementation and
countable unions. Elements of F are called events and F can be thought of as a general space
of possibilities (not just maximally specific ones). We assume the standard ratio definition
of conditional probability:
P (A|E) = P (A ∩ E)
P (E)
, when P (E) > 0.
Let P be a set of probability measures. Such a set can be interpreted, for example, as
the probability measures an agent regards as permissible to use in inference and decision
problems, those distributions he hasn’t ruled out for such purposes. If P is convex, it associates
with any event in the algebra an interval of probability values (such as [0.1, 0.9]).5 We can
now define dilation precisely.
Definition 1. Let P be a set of probabilities on (Ω,F), let B be a positive partition of Ω6,
and let A ∈ F . We say that the partition B dilates A just in case, for each E ∈ B,
inf{P (A|E) : P ∈ P} < inf{P (A) : P ∈ P} ≤ sup{P (A) : P ∈ P} < sup{P (A|E) : P ∈ P}.
4There is by now a fairly extensive literature on dilation (e.g., Walley, 1991; Seidenfeld and Wasserman,
1993; Herron et al., 1994; Wasserman and Seidenfeld, 1994; Herron et al., 1997; Pedersen and Wheeler, 2014,
2015; Nielsen and Stewart, 2019).
5We call P convex when P,Q ∈ P implies aP + (1− a)Q ∈ P for every a ∈ [0, 1]. The convex hull of a set
of points is the smallest convex set containing those points.
6The partition B is positive if E ∈ B implies E ∈ F and P (E) > 0 for all P ∈ P. Note that this definition
entails that every cell of B is measurable. Also note that positive partitions are necessarily countable.
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It is clear that precise credal states are dilation-immune since inf{P (H|E)} = sup{P (H|E)}
for all H and E in F such that P (H|E) is defined.
Consider the following common example of dilation, introduced in outline earlier (Herron
et al., 1994; Pedersen and Wheeler, 2015). We simplify by assuming that P consists of just
two probabilities.
Example 1. Let P = {P1, P2} be a set of probabilities on (Ω,F). Suppose that, for G ∈ F ,
P1(G) = 0.1 and P2(G) = 0.9. Relative to P, then, G is a highly uncertain event. Consider
the toss of a coin that is fair according to both P1 and P2: P1(H) = P2(H) = 1/2 =
P1(H
c) = P2(H
c). Suppose that the outcomes of the coin toss are independent of the event G
according to both P1 and P2. Then, P1(G∩H) = P1(G)P1(H) and P2(G∩H) = P2(G)P2(H).
Let A be the “matching” event that either both G and H occur or both do not. That is,
A := (G ∩ H) ∪ (Gc ∩ Hc). Notice that P1(A) = 1/2 = P2(A). Despite initial agreement
concerning A, the coin toss dilates P1 and P2 on A. For i ∈ {1, 2},
Pi(A|H) = Pi([(G ∩H) ∪ (G
c ∩Hc)] ∩H)
Pi(H)
=
Pi(G ∩H)
Pi(H)
=
Pi(G)Pi(H)
Pi(H)
= Pi(G).
So even though both P1 and P2 assign probability 1/2 to A initially, learning that the coin
lands heads yields P1(A|H) = 0.1 and P2(A|H) = 0.9. Hence, P1(A|H) < P1(A) ≤ P2(A) <
P2(A|H). Analogous reasoning establishes that P2(A|Hc) < P2(A) ≤ P1(A) < P1(A|Hc). 4
Some see in dilation grounds for rejecting the notion that imprecise probabilities provide a
normatively permissible generalization of standard Bayesian probability theory (e.g., White,
2010; Topey, 2012). It is not just that it seems intuitively wrong that learning should increase
uncertainty. Dilation has further consequences. For example, dilation leads to violations of
Good’s Principle. Good’s Principle enjoins us to delay making a terminal decision if presented
with the opportunity to first learn cost-free information. For the standard, Bayesian expected
utility framework, Good’s Principle is backed up by a theorem. Good famously shows that,
in the context of expected utility maximization, the value of making a decision after learning
cost-free information is always greater than or equal to the value of making a decision before
learning (Good, 1967).7 Dilation, however, leads to the devaluation of information (e.g.,
Pedersen and Wheeler, 2015). With dilation, an agent may be willing to actually pay to
forgo learning some information, what Kadane et al. label “negative tuition” (Kadane et al.,
2008).
3. Distention
What would it mean for uncertainty to grow with respect to every cell of an experimental
partition, though not uncertainty about a single, fixed event? We adopt the same metric
that Blackwell and Dubins employ to gauge consensus in the context of merging of opinions.
For any two probabilities, P1 and P2, the total variation distance d is given by
d(P1, P2) = sup
A∈F
|P1(A)− P2(A)|.
7More precisely, the value of deciding before learning is given by the maximum expected utility of the
options. That value is always less than or equal to the expected value of the maximum expected utility of
the options after learning, where expected utility after learning is calculated with the relevant conditional
probability.
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When d(P1, P2) = 0, it follows that P1 = P2. And if P1 and P2 are within  according to d,
they are within  for every event in the algebra. We will have occasion to appeal to the fact
that, in finite probability spaces, the total variation distance is given by
d(P1, P2) = P1(A0)− P2(A0), (1)
where A0 = {ω ∈ Ω : P1(ω) > P2(ω)} (e.g., Nielsen and Stewart, 2020).
So we take it that for global uncertainty to grow with respect to each cell of an experimental
partition is for the total variation to increase conditional on each cell.8 That, in turn, means
that, for every cell, there is some event such that the “distance” between the probabilities
for that event conditional on that cell is greater than the distance between probabilities for
any event unconditionally. For an arbitrary set of probabilities, we look at the supremum of
the total variation for all elements of the set. To simplify notation, let us adopt some metric
space terminology and call d(P) = supP,Q∈P d(P,Q) the diameter of P. If P (E) > 0 for all
P ∈ P, then let us write PE = {PE : P ∈ P}, where PE = P (· | E). We should stress that
whenever we write PE , we are assuming that all P ∈ P assign E positive probability.
Definition 2. Let P be a set of probabilities on (Ω,F), let B be a positive partition of Ω.
We say that the partition B distends P just in case, for each E ∈ B,
d(P) < d
(
PE
)
.
Another way to think of distention is that a partition that distends P pushes the elements of P
further from consensus. When P is interpreted as the credal state of a single agent, the closer
a set of probabilities gets to “consensus,” the closer it is that uncertainty is reduced to risk—
a unique probability function—for an agent. So distention pushes uncertainty further from
being reduced to simple risk. Like dilation, then, distention is a way that uncertainty grows
whatever the outcome of an experiment. Unlike dilation, though, the focus for distention is
on total variation distance and not the probability of a single, fixed event.
As repeatedly noted in the literature (e.g., Seidenfeld and Wasserman, 1993; Pedersen and
Wheeler, 2015), dilation bears certain similarities to non-conglomerability. Let B = {Ei :
i ∈ I} be a positive partition. We say that A is conglomerable in B when
inf{P (A|E) : E ∈ B} ≤ P (A) ≤ sup{P (A|E) : E ∈ B}.
And we say that P is conglomerable inB if the above inequalities hold for all events A. When
A is non-conglomerable in B, P (A) cannot be regarded as a weighted average of the proba-
bilities P (A|Ei). If B is a countable partition and P is not conglomerable for A in B, then
the law of total probability fails. This happens only when P fails to be countably additive.
Schervish et al. prove that, for any merely finitely additive probability P (on a space admit-
ting a countably infinite partition), there is some event A and countable partition B such
that P fails to be conglomerable for A in B (1984). One reason non-conglomerability is odd
is because it allows for reasoning to foregone conclusions (Kadane et al., 1996). Merely run-
ning an experiment, regardless of the outcome, allows one to uniformly increase (or decrease)
one’s estimate in some event. In other words, an experiment could be designed such that,
before even running it, the experimenter can be sure that conditionalizing on the outcome
will yield a higher (or lower, depending on the case) probability for the event in question.
Like dilation, non-conglomerability also leads to the devaluation of information in violation
of Good’s Principle (e.g., Pedersen and Wheeler, 2015). Distention, like dilation but unlike
8See subsection 7.3 for some comments on alternative interpretations of increasing global uncertainty.
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non-conglomerability, can occur even on finite sets. So, like dilation, but perhaps unlike non-
conglomerability, distention cannot be explained away by poor intuitions concerning infinite
sets.
4. Distention Is Logically Independent of Dilation
Given certain conceptual similarities between distention and dilation, it is natural to ask
about their logical relations. The answer to that query is that dilation does not imply
distention, nor does distention imply dilation. In other words, dilation and distention are
logically independent.
To see that dilation does not imply distention, return to the coin example from earlier.
Example 2. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, A = {ω1, ω2}, and H = {ω1, ω4}. Let P = {P,Q},
given on the following table along with their updates on H and on Hc.
Table 1. Dilation without Distention
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
P 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.45
Q 0.45 0.05 0.45 0.05
PH 0.1 0 0 0.9
QH 0.9 0 0 0.1
PH
c
0 0.9 0.1 0
QH
c
0 0.1 0.9 0
Take B = {H,Hc} as our experimental partition (the outcome of a flip of a fair coin). From
the table we compute P (A) = 0.5 = Q(A). Yet, P (A|H) = 0.1 and Q(A|H) = 0.9. Similarly,
P (A|Hc) = 0.9 and Q(A|Hc) = 0.1. So, B dilates P on A. However, again computing from
the table using Equation 1, we have d(P,Q) = d
(
PH , QH
)
= d
(
PH
c
, QH
c)
= 0.8. It follows
that dilation does not entail distention. 4
To see that distention does not imply dilation, consider the following simple example.
Example 3. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, H = {ω1, ω2}, and P = {P,Q}, given on Table 2.
Consider the partition B consisting of H and its complement.
Table 2. Distention without Dilation
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
P 1/10 1/5 1/10 3/5
Q 1/10 1/10 1/5 3/5
PH 1/3 2/3 0 0
QH 1/2 1/2 0 0
PH
c
0 0 1/7 6/7
QH
c
0 0 1/4 3/4
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While d(P,Q) = 1/10, d
(
PH , QH
)
= 1/6, and d
(
PH
c
, QH
c)
= 3/28. So B distends P. But
it does not dilate any event. Not only is there no dilation in B, no partition of Ω dilates any
event. This can be checked, a bit tediously, by hand.9 4
A set of probabilities cannot exhibit distention on a smaller sample space. That is because any
(non-trivial) partition on a smaller space will have a singleton as a cell. In that case, provided
the partition is positive, the distance between probabilities conditional on a singleton is 0.
We submit that the short run that is relevant to merging of opinions is the short run
behavior of total variation distance and not the sort of behavior exemplified by dilation. After
all, it is the total variation distance that Blackwell and Dubins use to measure consensus.
Examples 2 and 3 show that dilation is in fact orthogonal to distention, but Example 4
shows that distention and dilation in a given partition are consistent (see the Appendix). We
summarize these findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. While a set P can exhibit both dilation and distention simultaneously with
respect to a single partition, dilation does not imply distention, nor does distention imply
dilation.
5. A Characterization of Distention
For any two probabilities P and Q and any two events A and E such that P (E), Q(E) > 0,
define a function B¯ as follows:
B¯P,Q(A,E) = P (A)
P (E)
− Q(A)
Q(E)
. (2)
In a way, the function B¯ sets the so-called Bayes factor in difference form. The Bayes factor
for P and Q with respect to A and E is defined as
BP,Q(A,E) = P (A)
P (E)
/
Q(A)
Q(E)
. (3)
Bayes factors have a distinguished pedigree in Bayesian thought (Good, 1983; Wagner, 2002;
Jeffrey, 2004). Wagner, for instance, contends that identical learning experiences for two
agents are captured by identical Bayes factors for their respective priors and posteriors rather
than by identical posterior opinions. But B¯ differs substantially in interpretation from a Bayes
factor. In particular, it is not assumed that either of P or Q is an update of the other.
The function B¯ allows us to state one simple characterization of distention. Since convexity
has played a prominent role in IP theory, we also state an equivalence with the distention of
the convex hull.10
Proposition 2. Let P be a set of probabilities on (Ω,F), and let B be a positive partition of
Ω. The following are equivalent.
(I) B distends P.
(II) For all E ∈ B there exist P,Q ∈ P, and A ⊆ E such that
B¯P,Q(A,E) > d(P). (4)
(III) B distends the convex hull of P.
9Note, though, that only partitions consisting of non-singleton cells, of which there are just three, need to
be checked. Dilation will be thwarted by any partition containing a singleton because the resulting conditional
distributions will agree.
10For one important debate about the normative status of convexity for IP, see (Levi, 1980; Seidenfeld
et al., 1989; Levi, 1990; Seidenfeld et al., 2010; Levi, 2009).
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We regard Proposition 2 as a first pass at characterizing distention. The problem of finding
such characterizations is more than a purely formal one. The characterizing conditions should
be relatively simple and provide insight into the “wherefore” of distention. It is not clear to
us that Proposition 2 satisfies the second desideratum.
6. Local and Global Polarization
Polarization is a social phenomenon. Accordingly, in our previous related study (2020), we
were concerned about its implications for social epistemology. But, as we noted there, social
epistemology and the theory of imprecise probability gain much from cross-fertilization. In
this paper, we exploit concepts from social epistemology in the hopes of gaining a deeper
understanding of the theory of imprecise probabilities.
Like dilation, local polarization is defined in terms of a specific event. Polarization in this
sense occurs when shared evidence pushes opinions about a specific event further apart.
Definition 3. Let P1 and P2 be probability functions on (Ω,F), and let A,E ∈ F . We say
that evidence E polarizes P1 and P2 with respect to the event A if
P1(A|E) < P1(A) ≤ P2(A) < P2(A|E).
The possibility of two agents polarizing when updating on shared evidence may itself come
as a surprise to some. In particular, the fact that it is possible for Bayesians to polarize
is a challenge to the view that rational agents who share evidence resolve disagreements.
Elsewhere, we have labeled this view The Optimistic Thesis about Learning (TOTAL) and,
at Gordon Belot’s suggestion, its proponents TOTALitarians (2020). Such a view seems to
underwrite many of our ordinary practices (in rational persuasion, advocacy, etc.) as well as
positions in current philosophical debates. For example, the view that an epistemic peer’s
disagreement is evidence of defect in one’s own beliefs, as some so-called conciliationists allege,
seems committed to TOTAL. Bayesian polarization, however, suggests TOTAL is false.
Not only does the definition of local polarization resemble that of dilation, local polar-
ization and dilation can be characterized in terms of similar conditions (cf. Seidenfeld and
Wasserman, 1993, Result 1; Nielsen and Stewart, 2020, Theorem 1). But we can be more
precise than mere resemblance. Let P = {P1, P2} and let B be a positive finite partition that
dilates A. Then there is some E ∈ B such that E polarizes P1 and P2 with respect to A. If
not, then dilation implies that
P1(A) ≤ P2(A) < P1(A | E)
for all E ∈ B, where we have assumed the first inequality without loss of generality. Multi-
plying by P1(E) and summing over E ∈ B yields
P1(A) =
∑
E∈B
P1(A)P1(E) <
∑
E∈B
P1(A | E)P1(E) = P1(A),
which is a contradiction. Hence, dilation guarantees that some cell of the dilating partition
is polarizing.
Central to the concept of global polarization is a measure of the extent of total disagreement
between two probability functions. Again, we adopt the total variation metric to assess total
disagreement. Naturally enough, we say that global polarization occurs when shared evidence
brings about an increase in total variation between two probability functions.
Definition 4. Evidence E polarizes P1 and P2 globally if d(P1, P2) < d
(
PE1 , P
E
2
)
.
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In contrast to the optimistic spin typically put on the Blackwell-Dubins merging result, our
consensus-or-polarization law shows that even very mild and plausible weakenings of the
relevant assumptions no longer entail almost sure consensus in the limit. Rather, agents
achieve consensus or maximally (globally) polarize with probability 1 (Nielsen and Stewart,
2020, Theorem 3).
Local and global polarization are logically independent. While probabilities can exhibit
local and global polarization simultaneously, global polarization does not imply local po-
larization, nor does local polarization imply global polarization (Nielsen and Stewart, 2020,
Proposition 1). As we saw above, the IP analogues of local and global polarization, dilation
and distention, respectively, exhibit the same sort of logical independence.
7. Some Upshots
7.1. Asymptotic Consensus. The primary precondition of Blackwell and Dubins’ merg-
ing theorem is absolute continuity.11 If P is absolutely continuous with respect to Q, then
Q(A) = 0 implies P (A) = 0 for all A ∈ F . Their theorem roughly says that if P is absolutely
continuous with respect to Q, then P assigns probability 1 to achieving consensus with Q in
the limit. The examples above involve regular prior distributions on finite probability spaces.
Every probability function is absolutely continuous with respect to a regular distribution. In
larger spaces, regularity is not achievable. This makes the issue of absolute continuity non-
trivial. Extending the theorem to sets of probability functions presents further complications.
Schervish and Seidenfeld establish that closed, convex sets of mutually absolutely continuous
probabilities that are generated by finitely many extreme points merge under Bayesian con-
ditionalization (Schervish and Seidenfeld, 1990, Corollary 1). In previous work, we generalize
this result, showing that closed, convex sets of mutually absolutely continuous probabilities
that are generated by finitely many extreme points merge under Jeffrey conditioning as well
(Stewart and Nielsen, 2019, Proposition 1).12 For such sets of distributions, the significance
of distention depends on the importance of the short run. In our opinion, the importance is
clear. For all Blackwell and Dubins’s theorem says, approximate consensus may be achieved
only in the very long run. Many things for which consensus is relevant happen in the not very
long run. Even if P is a set of mutually absolutely continuous probabilities (and so subject
to the merging theorem), not only may its elements fail to achieve consensus in the short
run, they might collectively distend, moving away from consensus whatever evidence comes.
Of course, if an IP set does not consist of mutually absolutely continuous priors, failure of
almost sure asymptotic consensus is a foregone conclusion.
7.2. Group Manipulation. Moving now to the social setting, distention implies the possi-
bility of a sort of group manipulation in the short run. Interpret a set P as the (individually
precise) probabilities of a group of agents. For certain such sets, an experiment can be de-
signed such that, no matter the outcome, the group will be further from consensus as a result
of learning shared evidence. If a policy decision or group choice requires consensus (or a
11The theorem also assumes that probabilities admit regular conditional distributions (Billingsley, 2008).
A stronger assumption that implies the existence of regular conditional distributions is that all sub-sigma-
algebras of the filtration are generated by countable partitions. This assumption is used, for example, in
(Kalai and Lehrer, 1994).
12One interesting thing about the generalization to Jeffrey conditioning is that, unlike standard Bayesian
conditionalization, Jeffrey conditioning does not generally preserve the convexity of the initial set (Stewart
and Nielsen, 2019, Proposition 3). Another is that “uncertain learning” has been rarely married with general
models of uncertainty along IP lines in the literature.
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tolerance of only  disagreement) on some algebra of events, such decision making can be
frustrated (at least in the short run) by a devious experimenter no matter the outcome of
the experiment.
7.3. Alternative Measures of Uncertainty. We have focused on total variation distance
because of its distinguished role in merging of opinions and, consequently, Bayesian thought,
and because of merging’s alleged contrast with dilation. Total variation, however, is one
example of a large class of divergences between probabilities known as f -divergences. Another
prominent example is Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence from Q to P defined in discrete spaces
by
DKL(P ||Q) = −
∑
i
P (ωi) log
Q(ωi)
P (ωi)
.
An important fact about KL divergence, often pointed out, is that, unlike total variation,
KL divergence is not a true metric. For instance, it is not symmetric. Above, we provided
an example of distention without dilation (Example 3). This example also establishes that
distention does not imply that the KL divergence increases across the partition. In particular,
DKL(P ||Q) > DKL(PE ||QE), as can easily be computed from Table 2. Still other, IP-specific
measures of uncertainty have been explored in the literature (e.g., Bronevich and Klir, 2010).
Absent strong reasons to privilege some such measure over the others—and perhaps there are
such reasons for total variation—these simple observations urge caution in drawing general
lessons from dilation- or distention-type phenomena.
7.4. “Pathologies” of Imprecision. The further ramifications of distention remain to be
explored. As we point out above, in the social setting, distention implies the possibility
of certain sorts of group manipulation. For an individual with an imprecise credal state,
an analogous sort of manipulation is possible in contexts in which a precise estimate is
desired. For certain credal states, an experimenter can guarantee that the agent gets further
(as measured by the total variation metric) from a precise estimate no matter what. How
dramatic are the consequences of this sort of manipulation? And what other sorts of surprising
effects, like the violations of Good’s Principle for dilation, might distention bring in tow? We
hope to explore these issues in future research.
One interesting point, we find, is that none of the alleged pathologies discussed in connec-
tion with imprecise probabilities seem to be at all unique to a specific IP phenomenon, nor
even unique to IP given social interpretations of sets of probabilities. Violations of Good’s
Principle do not require dilation. Non-conglomerability leads to such violations, too. Nei-
ther does the strange phenomenon of learning increasing uncertainty imply dilation. With
distention, uncertainty increases whatever evidence comes in as well. In a social setting, dila-
tion and distention are somewhat robbed of their apparent counterintuitive sting. The lesson
there is that updating on shared evidence does not guard against various types of group opin-
ion polarization (what could be called “social uncertainty”), as mundane examples illustrate
(Nielsen and Stewart, 2020).
One might take these anomalies as an argument for restricting to precise probabilities on
finite spaces—by our lights, far beyond the pale of what is warranted. For one thing, continu-
ous random variables are essential in many scientific applications and are unavailable in finite
spaces. For another, violations of Good’s Principle do not require imprecise probabilities, so
the restriction to precise probabilities fails as a safeguard. True, there are no instances of
non-conglomerability in finite spaces, but suppose with us that the restriction to such spaces
is too costly. By requiring countable additivity, one guarantees conglomerability in countable
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partitions. But, depending on the theory of conditional probabilities that we adopt, even
countably additive probabilities can exhibit non-conglomerability in uncountable partitions.
And the moral is more general still (Schervish et al., 2017). So such proposed restrictions are
costly, hasty, and ineffective.
Appendix
Example 4
The following example shows that a set P can exhibit both dilation and distention simul-
taneously with respect to a single partition.
Example 4. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, E = {ω1, ω2}, and A = {ω1, ω3}. We take B =
{E,Ec} as our experimental partition.
Table 3. Distention is Consistent with Dilation
ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4
P 1/100 37/100 30/100 32/100
Q 20/100 41/100 1/100 38/100
PE 1/38 37/38 0 0
QE 20/61 41/61 0 0
PE
c
0 0 30/62 32/62
QE
c
0 0 1/39 38/39
Calculating the total variation distance from the table, we have d(P) = d(P,Q) = 0.29,
d
(
PE , QE
) ≈ 0.302, and d (PEc , QEc) ≈ 0.46. So B distends P. For dilation, notice that
Q(A) = 21/100 and P (A) = 31/100. But PE(A) = 1/38 < 21/100 < 31/100 < 20/61 =
QE(A). Similarly, QE
c
(A) = 1/39 < 21/100 < 31/100 < 30/62 = PE
c
(A). So, B dilates A.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We start by showing that (I) and (II) are equivalent. Suppose that (II) holds and let
E ∈ B. Then there exist P,Q ∈ P, and A ⊆ E such that
d(P) <
∣∣PE(A)−QE(A)∣∣ ≤ d (PE , QE) ≤ d (PE) .
Hence, B distends P, so (II) implies (I).
Conversely, suppose that B distends P and let E ∈ B. Then there are P,Q ∈ P such that
d(P) < d
(
PE , QE
)
.
Let p and q be densities for P and Q, respectively, with respect to any common dominating
measure m, that is, both P and Q are absolutely continuous with respect to m. (Let m =
P/2 +Q/2, for instance.) Define
pE =
1Ep
P (E)
and qE =
1Eq
Q(E)
,
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so that pE and qE are densities for PE and QE with respect to m. Note that the set
A =
{
ω ∈ Ω : pE(ω) > qE(ω)} is a subset of E because if ω /∈ E, then pE(ω) = 0 = qE(ω).
We now have,
d(P) < d
(
PE , QE
)
= PE(A)−QE(A) = P (A)
P (E)
− Q(A)
Q(E)
= B¯P,Q(A,E),
where the first equality is the general version of (1). This establishes (II), and shows that (I)
and (II) are equivalent.
Next, we show that (I) is equivalent to (III). We use the following lemmas and include
proofs for the reader’s convenience.
Lemma 1. For any set of probabilities P, d(P) = d(co(P)).
Proof of Lemma 1. Since P ⊆ co(P), d(P) ≤ d(co(P)). To show the reverse inequality, let
P,Q ∈ co(P) be arbitrary. Then, P = ∑ni=1 aiPi, Q = ∑mj=1 bjPj for some n,m ∈ N,
Pi, Pj ∈ P, and ai, bj ≥ 0 with
∑
i ai = 1 =
∑
j bj . For all A ∈ F ,
|P (A)−Q(A)| =
∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
aiPi(A)−
m∑
j=1
bjPj(A)
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
ai
m∑
j=1
bjPi(A)−
m∑
j=1
bj
n∑
i=1
aiPj(A)
∣∣∣
≤
n∑
i=1
ai
m∑
j=1
bj |Pi(A)− Pj(A)| ≤
n∑
i=1
ai
m∑
j=1
bjd(P) = d(P).
Since this holds for all A ∈ F , we have
d(P,Q) ≤ d(P).
And since this holds for all P,Q ∈ co(P), we have
d(co(P)) ≤ d(P),
which proves the lemma. 
Lemma 2. For any set of probabilities P, co
(
PE
)
= co(P)E .
Proof of Lemma 2. First, let P ∈ co (PE). Then P = ∑ni=1 aiPi(· | E) for some n ∈ N,
Pi ∈ P and ai ≥ 0 with
∑
i ai = 1. Let bi =
ai
Pi(E)N
≥ 0, where N = ∑i aiPi(E) is a normalizing
constant that ensures
∑
i bi = 1. Then,
P =
n∑
i=1
aiPi(· | E) =
∑
i
aiPi(·∩E)
NPi(E)∑
i
aiPi(E)
NPi(E)
=
∑
i biPi(· ∩ E)∑
i biPi(E)
=
(∑
i
biPi
)
(· | E) ∈ co(P)E .
Hence, co
(
PE
) ⊆ co(P)E .
Next, suppose that P ∈ co(P)E . Then P = (∑ni=1 aiPi)(· | E) for some n ∈ N, Pi ∈ P and
ai ≥ 0 with
∑
i ai = 1. Let bi =
aiPi(E)
N and N =
∑
i aiPi(E). Then,
P =
(∑
i
aiPi
)
(· | E) =
∑
i aiPi(· ∩ E)∑
i aiPi(E)
=
∑
i
aiPi(E)
N
Pi(· ∩ E)
Pi(E)
=
∑
i
bi
Pi(· ∩ E)
Pi(E)
=
∑
i
biPi(· | E) ∈ co
(
PE
)
.
Hence, co(P)E ⊆ co (PE), and the proof is complete. 
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Using Lemmas 1 and 2, if (I) holds, then for all E ∈ B
d(co(P)) = d(P) < d
(
PE
)
= d
(
co
(
PE
))
= d
(
co (P)E
)
.
Hence, (III) holds. And if (III) holds, then for all E ∈ B
d(P) = d (co (P)) < d
(
co (P)E
)
= d
(
co
(
PE
))
= d
(
PE
)
.
Hence, (I) holds. This shows that (I) and (III) are equivalent. 
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